I-Introduction
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the economic consequences of countries, which at the same time are exposing themselves to risks of triggering financial crises by increasing their internal debts (ID) and / or external debts (ED), but also protect themselves from future financial crises by accumulating International Reserves (IR). Using the financial stress indicator (FSI), which estimates the likelihood of a country to be victim of a financial crisis given its domestic economy, we will determine which of IR or debts affect more the crisis.
The majority of previous studies were designed to determine whether or not there is a positive / negative relationship between an aggregate / feature economic and financial crisis such as the positive relationship between financial openness and crises through financial intermediaries (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001 , Prassad et al 2004 , Mishkin 2005 , Rancière 2006 , Dufrénot et al, 2011 , and positive relationships between exchange rates and crises (Kaminsky et al 1998 , Reinhart 2000 , Obstfeld 2004 , and between debt and crises (Rajan et al 2009 , Benmelech et al 2011 and between regulation and crisis (Aizenman 2009 , Mishkin 2011 and finally between Foreign Direct Investment and Debt Crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a) . In this present paper, we aim to analyze two variables that have opposite effect on the financial crises. We will base our paper on the hypothetical conclusions of previous studies:
1 -International reserves, as explained by Aizenman and Marion (2004) , Calvo (2006) , Aizenman and Lee (2007, 2008) and , are considered such as buffer stock, hence the role of "self-insurance" against financial crises caused primarily by external drain. Indeed, the 90s-2000s were marked by severe financial crises, mainly involving more countries in Latin America and East Asia who are ''dependent'' from foreign currency and economic results of their faults (excess debts, trade deficits and / or their rate of de-facto dollarization). Since these dramatic events, countries proved a "psychological impact" as defined by and seek to hedge against any recurrence. Since then, the accumulation of foreign reserves is growing up feeling the "fear of losing International reserves" in order to guarantee stability in the exchange rate following the intervention of systematic markets as it was mentioned by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) .
3 2-In addition to its "auto-insurance" effect against crises, hoarding International reserves can promote a mercantilist export promotion, especially in the exporting countries or emerging countries. In other way, the purchase of foreign currencies encourages the depreciation of the domestic currency or at least keeps the exchange rate of the national currency stable, thus resulting in better external competitiveness and promoting export. Finally, hoarding
International reserves can be a tool of richness for a country by providing equilibrium and economic growth to the economy (Vidon, 2007) .
3 -Debts and more precisely external debt in foreign currency are for the most cases, the major cause for triggering the crisis and practically the main cause of the Asian crisis and Latin America especially for countries that adopt a more or less flexible exchange rate (Calvo and Mishkin ,2003) , hence recent crisis (end of 1990 and begin of 2000) were define as "foreign debt crisis years". According to Rogoff (2008 and , domestic debt as well as external debt is very dangerous for the economy, and an increase of about 90% and 60% respectively of domestic debt and external debt can be an alert for a future financial crisis. Moreover, consequences in the economy growth of external debt are even more than two times more dangerous than domestic debt. Reinhart, 2010 mentioned that no country is totally protected from by a financial crisis.
Emerging countries that accumulate foreign reserves, almost sterilize them. The sterilization according to Calvo in 1991 increases the internal debts after they monetize. However, the domestic debts are as dangerous as external debts (Calvo, 2006) , and represent the key barrier to Economic Progress and sources of Macroeconomics vulnerability.
From these above assumptions, we go on with this article to answer the following question:
Given that the accumulation of foreign reserves acts as a "moderator shock" or "selfinsurance" against potential financial crises, and given that debts (domestic and / or foreign) are the causes that weaken economies and expose them to eventual financial crisis, what would be the consequences of a country characterized by both increasing debts (increased risk) and accumulation of international reserves (reduced risk)? In other words, will an indebted country and "secured" by hoarding IR be safe from crises?
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To answer these questions, we will therefore only focus on debt (internal and / or external), vis-à-vis the accumulation of international reserves, despite the presence of other economic factors (exchange rates, interest rates, financial openness, economic policy, inflation ...) that can have positive relation with financial crisis.
The countries that will be studied 1 are Turkey, Russia, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil.
Other countries like Korea and Lebanon would be of interest to include in our study because of their very high level of hording international reserve, and their important level of debt (Domestic debt for Japan and external and domestic debt for Lebanon) but due incomplete data, these countries will be studied later, in further article.
The financial crisis and its probability will be measured using the TVTPMS model to study the "offset" of the indicator of financial stress FSI when we add external variables such debt and IR. The FSI includes five different financial aspects, all interconnected. 1-The pressuremarket exchange rate, 2-the default risk, 3-the beta of banking, 4-the stock price return and 5-time varying stock return volatility. Details will be treated below.
This model does not predefine the date of onset of the crisis or the date of the crisis, but determine the main endogenous variables responsible to secure or undermine the financial market of each country. In other words, this model gives us the probability whether a country will or will not have a crisis, by analyzing its endogenous economic characteristics.
In the second part of this paper, we will quote the literature on the risks of debt and the benefits of reserve accumulation. Then the third part will focus on the theoretical model and the details of the data. Finally the fourth part concerns the interpretation of results.
Conclusion will end the study with quick summary of results and of contribution to economic.
1 Lebanon and Japan will be continued in further studies 5
II-Literature

A-From Debt and Financial Integration to Financial Crisis
Even though most recent financial crises originate from the United States, emerging countries have suffered too: as a result of strong financial and economic integration.
With the world globalization, financial openness is now inevitable. Its advantages especially in emerging countries are studies by Hoxha et al, (2009 ), Obsfeld (2009 , Kose et al (2008) , Prasad et al (2004) , Mishkin (2005) , Ranciere, et al (2006) , Reinhrad and Tokatlidis (2002) and many other economist who concluded that financial openness can promote welfare growth (Hoxha et al 2009) , expansion of financial sector, growth of GDP (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundbld 2005) , increase inflows when financial openness is associated with a decrease in price and relax the constraints borrowing.
Therefore, we can witness how Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Russia, and other countries have opened their financial market in order to increase their financial liberalization.
However the positive effect of the financial openness is not automatic, and may even be not apparent, but in contrary, as criticized by Kaminsky and Smuckler (2002) However, financial liberalization is not the unique responsible nor the main reason of those crisis. According to Calvo (2006) , "Nothing is more disastrous" than to open the financial market while being financially crippled by a high debt. Latin America emerging countries that have dollarized debts (which should repay their debts in foreign currencies), and therefore are dependent on the exchange rate (if floating regime) become economically weak and susceptible to potential financial crises (Calvo, 2006) .
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Indeed, Calvo and Mishkin (2003) Let us consider for example, countries such Korea, Chili, Argentina and other that suffered from "flight to quality" of their inflow, which consist of capital flight of investors in order to invest in other countries more securely. Their IR permit to confront exchange crisis for a while and to avoid the bankruptcy of the banking system, especially when IR covered external debt, as in Korea.
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The relation between debt and IR is treated by several authors. Increase the IR and external debt have a positive relation according to Dominguez (2009) , and Obsfeld et al (2009) , and in some cases, if IR are sterilized, external debt will prompt rises in domestic debt by monetizing it (Calvo 1991) .
According to Calvo (2003) , a country that has an excessive external debt, hoarding reserves will not be sufficient to avoid a crisis, but may be useful during the "sudden stop" crises (2006) . As mentioned by the "Grennspan-Guidotti" rule, an adequate level of IR should exceed the level of short-term external debt. This rule has for years been considered as the most adherents and empirical support. Recently, Obsfeld et al (2009) mentioned that despite the focus on the "Guidotti-Greenspan" rule and sudden stops in the literature, short term external debt is not a significant predictor of reserve holdings, though another variable often considered in more traditional models, the Trade to GDP ratio is.
III-Empirical Framework
A-The measurement of the Financial Stress Indicator
The literature is almost based on narrative evidence (expert judgment), to determine different types of crisis, with the need of some selected indicators that point to historical regularities such the exchange rate devaluation and the state of foreign reserve (e.g. Eichengreen and Bordo, 2002; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff,2009; Laeven and Valencia,2008) . These latter narratives were essential in order to complete the empirical studies of Goldstein et al, 2000 , and constructing/using binary variables
The empirical studies (e.g Goldstein et al., 2000) used binary variables that were constructed based on these narratives. Binary crisis variables don't consider periods of small scale stress that did not result in full-blown crisis. This latter is considered by the continuous stress indicator, which is its main advantage.
The Financial Stress Index was defined differently from a financial institution to another, for example, Starting with the Bank Credit Analyst (BCA), the financial stress index for the USA was reported monthly, based on the performance of banking shares as compared to whole stock market, credit spreads and the slope of the yield curve, and the new issues of stock, bonds and consumer confidence. According to the IMF, the Financial Stress Indicator FSI is defined as a period when the financial system of a country is under strand and its ability to intermediate impaired.
Based on the study of Cardarelli et al (2009), they calculated the index based on highfrequency data, where the price changes are measured with respect to its previous levels or trend value. These variables are standardized and aggregated into a single index FSI usingequal weighting for each country and period.
At the beginning, the FSI comprises three financial market segments (subcomponents): 1-banking sector (the slope of the yield curve, TED spread, the beta of banking sector stock), 2-securities markets (corporate bonds spread, stock markets returns and time-varying volatility of stock returns), and 3-exchange markets (time varying volatility of NEER changes). Then, Balaskrishnan et al (2009) modify the previous index to account for specific conditions of emerging economies by adding on one hand, the measure of exchange rate pressure (currency depreciation and decline in foreign reserves) and the sovereign debt spread, and on the other hand, the downplaying the banking sector measure (slope of the yield curve and TED spread).
Thus, The EM-FSI 5 used as endogenous variable comprises five variables:1-the "bankingsector beta," denoted as β, 2-the stock market returns, 3-the time-varying stock market return volatility, 4-the sovereign debt spreads, and 5-the exchange market pressure index (EMPI).
The overall index is a composite measure of these sub-indices and captures price changes in these markets relative to past trends as they are likely to signal strain in financial markets or intermediation:
EM-FSI = β + Stock market returns + Stock market volatility + Sovereign debt spreads + EMPI
Each variable is demeaned (using the arithmetic mean) and divided by its standard deviation, that is, each variable is standardized.
-A value of zero implies neutral financial market conditions on average across the subindices; while positive values imply financial strain (i.e. prices are on average above means or trends).
-A value of 1 indicates a one-standard deviation from average conditions across sub-indices.
-A value of 1.5 or higher has in the past been associated with a crisis.
The FSI is robust to other weighting schemes, including those based on principal components.
Banking Sector:
The "banking-sector beta" is the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) beta, and is defined as follows:
,, ,
Where r represents the year-over-year banking or market returns, computed over a 12-month rolling window. In line with CAPM, a beta greater than 1-indicating that banking stocks move more than proportionately with the overall stock market-suggests that the banking sector is relatively risky, and would be associated with a higher likelihood of a banking crisis.
To better capture banking-related financial stress, the banking beta was recorded only when banking returns were lower than overall market return. Sources: DataStream. 
Securities Markets
Foreign Exchange Markets
The EMPI captures exchange rate depreciations and declines in international reserves, and is defined for country i in month t as: As for exogenous variables, we use the International reserves and external debt because of the opposite consequences but with same trend: , Dominguez 2007 ; this means that the more is high the external debt, the more the country will need to accumulate international reserve, and vice versa. We will consider the internal debt by studying the total debt because according to Calvo (2006) , domestic debt is as serious and dangerous as external debts. This latter represent the key barriers to economic progress and sources of macroeconomic vulnerability.
Exogenous variables are expressed in the fallowing way:
1-STED/GDP is (Short Term External Debt on GDP in billion of US dollar and percentage). there is studies using model with several regimes (Calvet and Fisher 2004) , this article will be limited to a model with two regimes in order to have enough number of "degree de liberté as well as to limit eventual numerical problems during the estimation.
2-TED/GDP (Total External Debt on GDP in Billion of US dollar in Billion US
The regimes are not preselected as would be the case if we were using the dummy variable 0/1. Indeed, the model verify whether at a given time t, the FSI index is considered to change in a low financial stress or high financial stress regime, owing to the fact that likelihood of being in either regime is governed by a latent unobservable two-state Markov chain variable.
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The formalization below follows Filardo (1994) , Filardo and Gordon (1998) , Laton and Smith (2007) , Kim et al (2010) .
Suppose that y t = μ(s t ) + ø(s t ) y t-1 + σεt, εt ~ N(0,1) (2) S t = {0,1} is a latent variable and μ(s t ) =μ1+ μ 2 (s t ) , ø(s t ) = ø1 + ø2(s t ).
μ(s t ) and ø(s t ) indicate that the average value of FSI and its autoregressive dynamic is regime-dependent.
Equation (2) can be generalized in order to include higher lags and a state-dependent residual standard error.
Since s t is assumed to follow a Markov-chain, the realization of each state is assigned a probability and the transition probability matrix is written as follow:
Where I t = {L t , L t-1 …} is the history of the leading indicator of the financial stress index (financial globalization variable). This formalization assumes that a country's financial openness to international financial market is informative with regard to the likelihood of a higher or a lower financial stress.
The functional form of the function p(.) and q(.) is assumed to be sigmoid and to map the leading indicator values into the [0,1] interval (logistic, Gaussian, Cauchy distributions).
We assume here a logistic function, as is common wisdom in the empirical literature using this class of models.
Assume that the two states correspond respectively to a lower financial stress (state0) and a higher financial stress (state 1). Then, we might have the following situations: 
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The sign of the leading indicator predict the likelihood of a low stress regime ONLY if the economy is already in that regime.
Assuming data and information we use in our model, cases 4 and 5 illustrate, if a financial stress situation can be avoidable or if a low financial situation will be welcomed.
In this study, parameters of equations 2, 3, and 4 are estimated jointly by using maximum likelihood 7 (ML), as shown below because of its computational ease. In fact, ML yields consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates in case if errors are normally distributed 8 .
The inverse of the matrix of second partial derivatives of the likelihood function computed at the true parameter values is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the parameter values.
IV-Results and Interpretation
A-Preliminary test and parameters understanding
Before estimating our model, we should be sure of the stationarity of all our variables.
Therefore, we tested them with the ADF test and results are reported in appendix 2, table 1. 
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Q=T ( When both intercept are non significant, this means that the model fails to identify 2 regimes.
Thus we can conclude from our estimations, that when the positive value of the intercept is statistically significant, it is usually higher than 1.5, this indicating a high financial stress period or a crisis.
In order to interprete if our leading indicators have a predictive power for the 2 regimes of high and low stress after ''m" quarters, we have to focus first, on the parameters As shown in this figure 1, all these countries suffered at least two sever financial crisis and enjoyed some period of low financial stress. In addition, they all have the same characteristics where they both increase external debt and international reserves which justify the choice of these five 5 countries as a sample for the present study.
As mentioned earlier, the figure1 shows period of low financial stress, were FSI index is below the average (1.5) and all countries have similar trend in calm period (with different degree). Therefore, the FSI index is useful to quantify the degree of intensity of a higher or lower stress, which is important for policy purpose. Decisions and measures taken by the Central Bank, and monetary authority should take into consideration the turning point in the index in order to detect business cycle and avoid and prevent upturns crisis.
1-The case of Turkey
The results of our estimations of Turkey are reported in the appendix 3, their policy decision since its variation can predict both, a high and a low financial stress by shifting from one regime to another. As for the Short term external debt, both, STED/GDP and STED/IR are informative, but the latter, the Grennspan-Guidotti ratio gives more sense since it gives prediction too in two regimes: in low financial stress and high financial stress.
Indeed, a decrease of STED/IR can insure a low financial stress two quarters later, even in period of stress, since the opposite side is significant, and since the increase of STED/IR can increase the likelihood of observing a high financial stress two quarters later. The STED/GDP
gives the same conclusion only in one regime, in the regime of low stress, where the θ Qt is positive and thus, can be an powerful indicator to predict a future low financial stress after two quarters if the STED/GDP decreases.
Concerning the IR, both IR/TED and IR/GDP are informative and give prediction only in one state, the state of low financial stress. Thus, the positive sign of the θ P which is statistical significant, indicates that an increase of the IR, relatively to TED and GDP can provide peace in the Turkish economy within two quarters, but the decrease of the IR will not necessarily cause a crisis. 
2-The case of Russia
Results of the case of Russia are reported in appendix 3, table 1. Only three variables with debts make sense, in other terms, IR/TED and IR/GDP are not significant, neither STED/TED although all intercept are. Starting with STED/GDP, we can see that θ Pt is negative and significant a 10%. As for TED/GDP while it is not considered at significant, because it is at 14%, its negative sign seems logical with the economic interpretation. In fact, for both variables, a decrease in debt can insure a low stress in the Russian economy two quarters
later. An increase in STED/GDP or the TED/GDP doesn't mean necessarily an increase of the likelihood of having a financial crisis.
What is important to discuss in this case, like for the previous case of turkey, the GrennspanGuidotti rule is informative in both states since both θ Pt and θ Qt are statistically significant and their sign give logical conclusion. In fact, a decrease of STED/IR provides information of having a future low stress, while a decrease can predict a high financial crisis. In this case, this variable STED/IR should be taken into consideration by monetary authority since any variation can shift from one regime to another. This variable indicates how Russian economy is sensitive to any variation of debt. In fact, our results seems to be in agreement with the past history: in 1998, difficulties in implementing fiscal reforms aimed at raising government revenue and a dependence on short-term borrowing to finance budget deficit let to a serious financial crisis in 1998, contributing to a sharp decline in Russia's earning from oil exports and resulting in an exodus of foreign investors. As well as for the crisis period of 2008, when Russia was suffered by the subprime crisis due to it contagion effect, thus, a depleting in the reserve about 100 billion Rubles, what causes a worse casein liquidity than that of 1998. In addition to the withdraw of IR, the external debt were increasing sharply, which made
Russian economy more and more vulnerable to crisis.
As for the STED/GDP, it should be noted that during the period 2000-2007 under the Putin's government, when the short term debt were maintain, in cooperation with the IMF, building up a Central Bank reserves with government budget, trade and current account surplus, the Russian economy has seen a peace economic years, characterized by a big economic growth.
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IR variables don't give sense in our analysis; this means they cannot detect low and/or high financial stress, thus, hoarding international reserves may not be a primordial monetary policy like for some other emerging countries. But since STED/IR is significant in both states (low and high financial crisis), this reinforce the past experience where the immediate cause if the 1998 crisis of Russia were the accumulation of STED in the form of treasury bills and bonds and the sharp decline of the IR between July 1998 and august 1998 (4.9%).
3-The Case of Argentina
In Argentina, the STED/GDP, the TED/GDP and the STED/TED showed in Appendix 3, table 3, are informative only in one state: the high stress regime. They can be responsible for increasing the likelihood of having a high financial crisis after four quarters, two quarters and 3 quarters respectively. This is showed by θ Qt which is statistically significant with a positive sign. In fact, the positive sign of θ Qt indicates that an increase of the leading variable (STED/GDP, TED/GDP, and STED/TED) will increase the likelihood of observing a financial crisis. These results are in parallel with economic theory and logical where the increase of these variables makes the economy vulnerable to crisis. Especially according to
Calvo & Reinhart studies from several years, Indeed, in the previous period of the main crisis of argentine (1998 & 2002) , as shown below in the figure -a-, the STED/GDP and the TED/GDP increased greatly. In fact, in 90s, before the crisis, Argentina was increasing its liabilities in foreign currency and in short term maturity without improving is export. Thus, the economy becomes depending on foreign currency, thus, the capital flight and sudden stop make Argentina vulnerable to crisis. In fact, in 1995, the foreign debt was unsustainable and has made it difficult for the nation to maintain currency convertibility, economic growth during that period. Later, in 2001, Argentine debt, held mostly in bonds, was massively sold short and the government found itself unable to borrow or meet debt payments.
Figure-a-The Short term external debt on GDP and Total external debt on GDP from 1997 to 2010 9
If results showed that increasing of foreign debt are good indicators to predict future financial crisis, their decrease doesn't justify it. In fact, because θ Pt are not significant in all of these cases, this indicates that a decreasing of foreign debt does not mean necessarily to insure a low financial stress, especially of the country in already in a crisis. Therefore monetary authority should focus their objectives on how to maintain the level of External debt in order to avoid a future financial crisis by cooperation to other economic policy, but not mainly how to decrease debts to insure economic peace. In 2008, during the international crisis, the debt Argentina re-entered international debt. Venezuela holds an estimated US$6 billion in Argentina debt. Moody's boosted Argentina's debt rating to B from BAs for IR variables, such the STED/IR, the IR/TED and the IR/GDP, the first one is not significant, since none of θ Qt and θ Pt is significant. As for IR/TED and IR/GDP, results seem to be interesting to analyze.
In fact, results indicate that any decrease of the IR whatsoever relating to total external debt or to GDP, this will increase the likelihood in Argentina to have financial crisis. The opposite conclusion doesn't hold up, and an increase of IR will not guarantee to increase the likelihood of having low financial crisis. In fact, this is what history told us. The IR has an important increasing trend, from 90s, but albeit this, Argentina suffered from several crisis, and this increasing trend didn't insure peace of the economy. We conclude that the IR is important in the economy of Argentina in order to avoid future financial crisis, but doesn't afford economic peace, although the increasing trend of IR. This might be due to the cost of IR which is not always sustainable, and may be due to the sterilization of IR policy that has cost and application constraints. Billion US dollar. One month later the real was devaluated and Brazil announced that its currency wills no more be pegged to US Dollar with an international support and in 1999 in order to maintain tight fiscal and monetary policy. Brazil knew difficult period concerning its inflation, its current account deficit, but not its external debt. where the trust is not complete, any uncertain period will led to a capital flight and flight to quality.
5-The case of Mexico
The tables 5 of appendix 3 shows that all variables used in our estimations are representatives (domestic currency) in 1994 that Mexico suffered from a collapse of its stock market, and later on, after the government has decided to float the peso against the US Dollar, the interest rate has increased and IMF intervened in order to help Mexican economy.
As for the IR and increase of the IR/TED will insure the Mexican economy a low stress period, but the decrease will not necessarily induce a high financial stress. In fact, Mexico, whether is doing effort to maintain low its inflation rate enjoying the FDI and its free market economy, it is suffering from a deficit of the trade balance and current account. Thus, according to the literature, an increase of IR/TED can be a kind of a sudden stop. Thus the role of the auto insurance of the IR.
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V-Summary
Our results show that not all variables can be useful for monetary authority in both period of high financial stress and low financial stress. None of our leading indicator could be informative as a turning point from one regime to another. In turkey, our results seem to be very strong. The external debt (short term and total external debt) are very informative and in both states. Thus, Decision of monetary authority should take into consideration the level of external debt whether they are in low financial stress or high financial stress; because of its power of predicting future change in both regimes. As for the IR, it plays the role of being the buffer stock and insurance to provide peace in the economy, but its absence or decrease will not trigger a financial crisis. The increases of IR reserves play a role of insuring a low financial stress but its decrease cannot inform any future financial crisis.
In the case of Russia, the Grennspan-Guidotti rule is informative in both states. In fact, a decrease of STED/IR provides information of having a future low stress, while a decrease can predict a high financial crisis. In this case, this variable STED/IR should be taken into consideration by monetary authority since any variation can shift from one regime to another.
This variable indicates how Russian economy is sensitive to any variation of debt. IR variables don't give sense in our analysis; this means they cannot detect low and/or high financial stress, thus, hoarding international reserves may not be a primordial monetary policy like for some other emerging countries. But since STED/IR is significant in both states (low and high financial crisis), this reinforce the past experience where the immediate cause if the 1998 crisis of Russia were the accumulation of STED in the form of treasury bills and bonds and the sharp decline of the IR between July 1998 and august 1998 (4.9%).
As for Argentina, debt variables and IR variables can't be a strategy for the government during a crisis. In other terms, when Argentina is suffering from a financial crisis, a decrease of debt and/or an increase in IR is not necessary a good decision to reduce the financial stress.
The government should have recourses to other economic variables in order to mitigate the situation. On the other side, when Argentina is enjoying a low financial stress, a decrease of IR and/or an increase in Debt are significant and so should be monitored. These variables increase the likelihood of observing high financial stress within a year and thus, should always be the focus of the government in order to keep low financial stress situation.
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As for Brazil, our results conclude that crisis is not due mainly to high external debt, and its increase does not necessarily increase the likelihood of observing financial crisis. On the other side, having a sustainable level of debt or a decreasing trend can be a good predictor to a future low financial stress. The IR reserve can be a tool for the monetary authority to avoid financial crisis since its decrease can predict a high financial stress. Therefore government of Brazil may rather focus on other economic variables such currency stability, inflation rate, balance of payment etc... In order to avoid future financial crisis and it should focus on keeping the International reserves high in order to insure stability and economic peace.
The case of Mexico, none of the studied variables can predict a future financial crisis, but they can insure a low financial crisis. Therefore, the government of Mexico, should not focus on Debt to avoid future financial crisis, but can use IR as a tool to maintain a low financial stress.
VI-Conclusion
Based on the results we obtained, we can conclude that the Leading Indicators studied, either IR or ED, are not necessarily all of significant, and therefore do not constitute for monetary authorities a main tools or decisions to handle.
Indeed, if the rise and / or decrease in external debt is significant to increase or to avoid the likelihood of future financial crises for Turkey, Russia, Argentina and Brazil, it is not for Mexico. Similarly, if increasing and / or decreasing International Reserves is significant in the increases and / or decreases the likelihood of financial crises in Turkey, Russia and Brazil, it is less so in Argentina and not in Mexico.
although countries chosen have common points such being emerging countries, accumulating international reserves, increasing external debt and having suffered from severe financial crisis in the end of 90s and the beginning 2000s, results are different from a country to another and this is due to the difference in the economic environment that makes the country more or less susceptible to financial crises during the variation of Leading Indicators.
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-APPENDIX -1 Figure 1 . THE FSI of Turkey, Russia, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico from 1997 to 2010. 503.88 
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